Abstract
INTRODUCTION
P roperty tax assessment ratios-a property's assessed value divided by its market value-determine the effective tax rates paid by owners and, therefore, the burden of fi nancing local public services. When ratios in the same assessment district vary, the property tax will not be applied uniformly. Some amount of variation is to be expected and is, on occasion, the result of an intentional policy, such as assessing different property types (e.g., industrial, residential) at different rates. Other types of non-uniformity are potentially more problematic. In particular, researchers have explored whether the property tax burden is shared fairly by taxpayers within and across different housing price strata. During a decade of steadily increasing tax bills, the distribution of the property tax has signifi cant implications for homeowners' standard of living.
When ratios for similarly priced houses are not uniform, horizontal inequities exist. For example, assessment ratios may vary systematically with a property's location (Haurin, 1988; Allen and Dare, 2002) , size (Berry and Bednarz, 1975) , or age (Goolsby, 1997) . In the last case, for example, owners of houses that are almost identical with the exception of the building's age were found to pay different effective tax rates for the same bundle of services.
Vertical inequities occur when assessment ratios are not consistent across a range of values. The tax can be considered "regressive" if lower-valued houses are assessed at a higher proportion of their market value, or "progressive" in the opposite case. The tendency for higherpriced properties to receive lower assessment ratios has been documented by Baar (1982) ; Bell (1984) ; Black (1977) ; Clapp (1990) ; Cornia and Slade (2005) ; Engle (1975) ; Haurin (1988) ; Ihlanfeldt (1982) ; Paglin and Fogarty (1972) ; and Sirmans, Diskin and Friday (1995) . Such fi ndings are taken as evidence of the regressivity of the property tax system since higher assessment ratios lead to higher effective tax rates when other factors are held constant.
1 Assessment studies provide extensive documentation of the tendency for assessment ratios to vary within and between different price segments of the same market, but they have provided little explanation of such fi ndings. A lack of horizontal uniformity has been attributed to the limited information about relevant property and neighborhood factors available to buyers, sellers, and assessors (Allen and Dare, 2002; Goolsby, 1997) . In such cases, more sophisticated appraisal techniques, such as interior inspections and mapping, appear to help assessors overcome such information defi ciencies and reduce errors (Bowman and Mikesell, 1978; Bowman and Butcher, 1986) . The primary explanation put forth for the potentially more serious problem of vertical inequity is that higher-priced properties may appreciate more quickly relative to the natural lag in assessments, which only change at fi xed intervals (Mikesell, 1980; Clapp, 1990; Ihlanfeldt, 2004) .
While we concur with these technical explanations for assessment inequities, we propose that one source of variation within price strata-namely the relatively sparse number of comparable sales in certain neighborhoods-may also explain some of the tendency toward relatively high assessment ratios for lower-priced properties. In other words, we ask whether the root cause of horizontal and vertical assessment inequities is one and the same. Our goal is to test the notion that assessment ratios will be not only less uniform but also higher in areas where prices are relatively unpredictable. In a thin market with few sales, relevant information cannot be incorporated quickly into either a property's market price or, by association, its assessed valuation. Therefore, assessments of land and improvements in inactive markets may vary signifi cantly for nearly identical properties in the same price strata and may well be biased systematically (i.e., horizontal inequities). Because sales of both very low-and very high-value properties are rare, assessment ratios for such properties are likely to be more error-prone and more variable. If only owners of the high-value properties appeal their tax bills, however, a more regressive distribution of assessment ratios may result.
Using assessment data from Chicago for small (six units or fewer) residential properties in 2003 and sale prices for [2004] [2005] , we test whether assessment uniformity and regressivity are infl uenced by the number of nearby sales. Chicago (as well as the rest of Cook County) has an unusually complicated classifi ed property tax system with a statutory assessment ratio of 16 percent of market value for residential properties. In practice, the average assessment ratio is less than ten percent. Moreover, we demonstrate that the city's assessments are more variable and regressive than is considered acceptable by the International Association of Assessing 1 For example, in a jurisdiction with a nominal tax rate of one percent and a simple proportional property tax system, the effective tax rate for a $100,000 home that is assessed at market value is one percent, while the effective tax rate is only 0.9 percent for a $500,000 home that is assessed at $450,000.
Offi cers. The city is home to a variety of housing markets, some of which are very active while others are considerably more dormant. In this environment of routine under-assessment and high variability of assessment ratios, homeowners in Chicago's thin markets may fi nd it difficult to gather the information required to appeal and reduce an assessment that is higher than expected yet still lower than the statutory ratio.
We replicate the traditional model to test for vertical equity, which regresses assessment ratios on sales prices. In addition, we include a variable that measures market activity by the number of residential sales in each Chicago census tract in which a property is located. Adding our new sales frequency variable to the model does not signifi cantly reduce the degree of regressivity indicated by the coeffi cient for sales price, which changes very little when the number of residential sales is added to the regression. However we do fi nd some evidence of horizontal inequities: assessment ratios tend to be higher in areas with few sales.
Our emphasis on assessment variability is not adequately captured by the traditional regression of assessment ratios on sales prices. A regression estimates a conditional expectation: what is the increase in the expected assessment ratio as sales prices increase? In contrast, our concern is with the entire distribution: as sales prices and sales frequencies increase, are assessment ratios more tightly clustered around a central value? As such, we propose a multinomial logit model to characterize the relationship between the assessment ratios and both sales prices and sales frequencies. The three-choice multinomial logit model estimates the probability that an assessment ratio is in either the bottom or top 25 percent of the distribution relative to the middle 25 percent-75 percent. We fi nd that having more sales in a census tract decreases the probability of having both high and low assessment ratios, which provides additional evidence of horizontal inequities. However, adding the sales frequency variable to the logit model, again, reduces but does not eliminate the finding of regressivity.
These results suggest that the traditional assessment ratio study provides an incomplete view of the assessment process. While assessment ratios tend to decline with higher sales prices and sales frequencies, this decline is accompanied by an overall reduction in the degree of variability. As such, our study demonstrates both the explanatory power of a variable that has been omitted by previous studies of both horizontal and vertical equity (with the exception of Allen and Dare (2002) ) as well as the relevance of a model that is capable of capturing the entire distribution of assessment ratios. Our results are consistent with a view of assessment practices in which assessors are striving for uniformity within and across price strata that is more diffi cult to achieve in thin markets.
EXPLAINING INEQUITIES IN PROPERTY TAX ASSESSMENT
Informational defi ciencies account for the general lack of uniformity in property tax ratios. Residential assessments are most commonly based on comparable sales.
2 Assessors are prone to making more errors when they do not have access to accurate information about comparable sales or when they lack the capacity to collect such data. When sample sizes are small, assessors may try to increase the sample by including more questionable 2 Sales transactions form the basis for market value estimates in 37 states (the others tend to rely on some measure of replacement cost) (DeBoer (1996) cited in Smith (2000)).
sales, imputing value based on sales in other neighborhoods that are not truly comparable, or making other adjustments. The more adjustments assessors make, the more potentially subjective and random the estimation of market value becomes. Similarly, buyers and sellers transact in open markets without perfect information about the existence and value of certain property characteristics. Variation in information across neighborhoods may cause the same priced property to be assessed at different rates (i.e., horizontal inequity).
Although the sales comparison approach works well in markets with many transactions of similar homes, it can provide seriously misleading estimates of market value for a more idiosyncratic home with few good comparable sales. As such, we would expect that assessments would be more variable in low-information environments, e.g., in areas where market values are slow to be revealed. In the only study to examine the infl uence of this variable, Allen and Dare (2002) fi nd that a lack of comparable sales makes accurate valuation more difficult for similarly priced properties. Properties located in zip codes with less sales activity exhibit more assessment error, which they measure as the difference between a property's assessment ratio and the mean assessment ratio for all properties in the taxing jurisdiction. Since assessors have access to a smaller quantity of information about property values in thin markets, assessment ratios are less likely to cluster near the statutory rate in these neighborhoods.
While variation in sales frequency might explain a general lack of assessment uniformity, it could also potentially explain the tendency for vertical inequities and, in particular, for property tax regressivity. The primary sources of vertical inequities in property tax systems have not been identifi ed (Oldman and Aaron, 1965; Smith, 2000) , although most assessment ratio studies have found convincing evidence of regressivity in the distribution of property taxes. One explanation that has been proposed is that fi ndings of vertical tax inequity are due to the frequency of assessment coupled with the rate of change in the underlying property values (Mikesell, 1980; Clapp, 1990; Ihlanfeldt, 2004) . Ideally, assessment dates should be as close to sales dates as possible. The less frequent the reassessment is, the less likely values are to refl ect market changes and current values. Declining areas would receive higher assessments, and appreciating areas would be underassessed.
If transaction activity and property values are correlated, lower-value homes might receive more variable assessments. Indeed, one might expect to find less demand for housing in areas with lower sales prices because of lower incomes, lower owner-occupancy rates, and the potentially higher operating and transaction costs in thin markets. Finding comparable sales can be particularly troublesome in large cities because many low-value areas are characterized by rental buildings that trade infrequently, older, unique homes that have few counterparts, and a large stock of substandard housing for which there is little market interest. However areas with very high-value homes may also be classifi ed as thin markets. Local governments use tactics like restrictive zoning to maintain a less dense stock of housing. High-value homes may also be customized in such a way that they have as great a likelihood of being inaccurately appraised as a severely deteriorated house. In other words, the limited comparability of marginal properties at both the extreme bottom and top of the value distribution may compromise the ability of the assessor to value those properties and may lead to less uniform assessments.
Low-value homes may receive consistently higher assessments (i.e., regressivity) if owners of such homes are less likely to appeal their bills. Although most property owners are uninformed about their assessment ratios and those of their neighbors, property taxes are highly visible and assessed on what is typically a household's largest asset (Wassmer, 1993) . Owners of high-value homes in thin markets may receive more variable assessments, but they might also have more knowledge about this lack of uniformity (Bowman and Mikesell, 1978) and the resources to address it if they believed their assessments were unusually high. They would be more prone to appeal their tax bills in the face of such inequities. If both extremely low-and extremely high-value homes receive more variable assessments but only the owners of high-value homes appeal, the distribution of assessment ratios will be skewed so that lower-value properties pay taxes on a larger share of their estimated market values. We investigate both hypotheses-that thin markets lead to both less uniform and more regressive distributions of assessment ratios-in the following sections.
TESTING VERTICAL EQUITY
If assessments exhibit vertical equity, assessments ratios should not vary with sales price. However, most studies fi nd that higher-priced homes receive lower assessments ratios. The prototypical assessment ratio study uses a variant of one of the two following equations to test for vertical equity:
where A represents assessed value and P is sales price. The typical fi nding from these is that α 1 < 0 or β 1 < 1. Either result implies that higher-priced homes receive lower assessment ratios. Additional explanatory variables have been added to equations [1] and [2] in studies such as Haurin (1988) , and nonlinearities have been taken into account using simple quadratic terms (Bell, 1984) and spline regressions (Birch, Sunderman, and Hamilton, 1990) . These modifi cations tend to reduce the magnitude of regressivity observed in prior studies.
We maintain the reasonable assumption that prices are easier to predict in areas with many sales. A high number of sales is likely to produce assessments that closely track sale prices, which in turn leads to low variation in assessment ratios. An open question is whether assessments are less regressive in areas with more sales. This question can be addressed by adding the number of sales to the estimating equation. Letting S represent the number of sales in a given geography, the modifi ed version of equation [1] is:
If the number of sales helps to explain assessment ratios and S is correlated with sales prices, then the estimated value of α 1 will change when S is added to the regression. For example, suppose that assessment ratios are higher in areas where prices are relatively unpredictable (i.e., S is small); in other words, α 2 < 0. Also, suppose that high-priced homes tend to be concentrated in areas with active sales markets, i.e., cov(P,S) > 0. If S is omitted from the regression, then the combination of α 2 < 0 and cov(P,S) > 0 implies Eα < α 1 . A fi nding that the estimated value of α 1 increases when S is added to the equation suggests that the presence of thin markets helps to explain assessment regressivity.
TESTING HORIZONTAL EQUITY
Although equation [3] follows naturally from traditional specifications, it also serves to highlight a shortcoming of these simple regression models. A regression estimates a conditional expectation: equation [3] implies a single expected value for the assessment ratio given values for P and S. Horizontal equity requires a test to determine whether higher sales frequencies lead to more uniform assessments, i.e., does the probability of extremely high or low assessment ratios decline as S increases? The conditional expectation is not the most appropriate measure when the objective is to measure assessment uniformity. 4 Fundamentally, testing for horizontal equity requires a move from a simple parametric specifi cation of the conditional expectation of the assessment ratio to a characterization of the distribution of assessment ratios conditional on the values of S and P. Do frequent sales reduce the number of extreme ratios? Do infrequent sales make either extremely high or low ratios more likely? Indeed, sale prices may exhibit a similar relationship with assessment ratios if high-priced homes are easier to assess. Whereas traditional sales ratio studies use regressions to calculate the expected ratios, our objective is to calculate the probability of observing unusually high or low ratios.
We propose a multinomial logit model to study horizontal equity by characterizing the relationship between the assessment ratio and the explanatory variables. To implement this model, we fi rst sort the assessment ratios from lowest to highest. The indicator variable for the logit model, I, takes on one of three values depending on the location of the observation in the assessment ratio distribution. We defi ne the base category, I = 0, as the middle 25 percent-75 percent of the assessment ratio distribution. We defi ne I = 1 when the ratio falls in the lowest 25 percent of the distribution, and I = 2 for observations in the top 25 percent of the distribution. The model estimates the probability that the assessment ratio falls in either the top or the bottom of the distribution, relative to the probability of being in the middle. Specifically, the estimated logit probabilities are:
Middle 50 percent of assessment ratios (I = 0):
Bottom 25 percent of assessment ratios (I = 1):
Top 25 percent of assessment ratios (I = 2):
The matrix X comprises the explanatory variables, which include sales price (or 4 To be concrete, suppose there are two areas under consideration, one with many sales (high S) and one with few sales (low S). In the fi rst area, assessment ratios are uniformly distributed between 0.09 and 0.11. In the second area, assessment ratios follow a bimodal distribution with peaks at 0.05 and 0.15, but still with an expected value of 0.10. Since the conditional expectation of 0.10 does not vary with S, a regression would indicate no relationship between the expected assessment ratio and S, despite our prediction being correct that higher values of S lead to more accurate assessments.
the predicted values), the number of sales in a census tract, and indicators that the property sold in 2005 (with 2004 as the base). The logit model generalizes the traditional approach by allowing for complex relationships among the variables. Our main goal is to test whether assessments are more uniform in areas with more sales. By adding a measure of sales frequency to the logit model, we can test whether a greater number of sales increases the probability of having an assessment rate in the middle of the distribution rather than in one of the tails. If prices are indeed easier to predict in census tracts with more sales, then the estimated coeffi cients on S are negative in both the I = 1 and I = 2 categories, i.e., there is less chance of being in either tail of the distribution.
The logit model also has implications for vertical equity: if assessments are regressive and higher sales prices lead to lower assessment ratios, then we expect to fi nd the coeffi cient on P to be positive in the I = 1 category and negative in the I = 2 category. In this case, higher prices increase the probability that assessment ratios are in the lowest quarter of the distribution and decrease the probability that they are in the highest quarter, relative to being in the middle half. The interactive effects of sales prices and frequencies also have implications for horizontal equity in this model. For example, suppose that high-priced homes are relatively easy to assess because they are located in areas with more sales. If both unusually high and low assessment ratios become less likely when sales prices increase, then we may fi nd that the estimated coeffi cients on P are negative in both the I = 1 and I = 2 categories. In this case, higher prices decrease the probability of being in the tails of the distribution, and the degree of uniformity increases with sales price.
DATA DESCRIPTION
All assessments in Cook County are conducted by the Cook County Assessor's Offi ce, whose director is elected to a fouryear term. The county, the second largest assessment district in the United States, is divided into triads, with properties in each triad re-assessed every three years. The Assessor's Offi ce uses sales price regressions from the previous three years to assess residential properties with six units or fewer. The eight townships in Cook County are divided into many assessment neighborhoods. The number of regressions estimated-i.e., the combinations of neighborhoods employed-varies according to the number of sales and the mix of residential and non-residential properties. The neighborhood defi nitions are reviewed periodically by fi eld appraisers, and each property is photographed in order to assist in accurate valuation. Signifi cant residuals are fl agged and reviewed. Assessed values based on the sales regression results are compared to recent sales prices for individual parcels and may be adjusted if signifi cant discrepancies are discovered. However, assessors wish to avoid the charge of "sales chasing," a term used to describe the practice of selectively increasing assessments for those properties that have sold recently (and, thus, whose market value can be most reasonably estimated).
With slightly more than a million small residential properties in the city of Chicago, most neighborhoods have enough sales to produce reasonably accurate assessments. However, the diversity of the housing stock in a large city makes assessments inherently difficult. For example, the high concentration of rental housing and the low quality of properties in some areas result in a scarcity of sales in many neighborhoods. The accuracy and uniformity of assessments are frequently challenged in the city; in 2003, assessor data reveals that approximately 20 percent of home owners appealed their property tax bills.
A Cook County ordinance specifi es that commercial and manufacturing properties be assessed at 38 percent and 36 percent of market value, respectively, with residential properties (six units or fewer) assessed at 16 percent of market value.
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In practice, assessment ratios fall below these rates, particularly for residential properties.
7 The Assessor's Offi ce is more interested in ensuring that assessments are a uniform share of market value than in forcing assessments to their statutory rate. The general underassessment of residential properties in Cook County is detected by state ratio studies and can affect funds received through state equalization formulae, but, to date, the state of Illinois has not penalized the county for its practices.
Our dataset also includes all sales of residential properties with six or fewer units in the city of Chicago in 2004 and 2005 . The data were provided by the Illinois Department of Revenue (IDOR), which is responsible for conducting assessment ratio studies for all Illinois townships and counties and for collecting the property transfer declaration forms that must be fi led when a property changes ownership. The IDOR eliminates non-arm's-length sales and any sales with unusual fi nancing. The remaining sales include a small number of extremely large and suspiciously small prices. To eliminate the effects of these unrepresentative observations without biasing the results, we symmetrically trim properties with the lowest one percent and highest one percent of the assessment ratios from the sample for each year. The fi nal dataset of sales prices includes 53,526 observations.
To construct our sales frequency variable, we match each property with the census tract in which it is located. We then calculate the number of sales of residential properties with six or fewer units that sold The Illinois constitution does not allow the highest assessment rate to be more than 2.5 times the rate for the lowest rate. In Cook County, the highest rate is for commercial and the lowest is for residential, which produces a ratio of 0.38/0.16, or 2.375. It is not certain whether effective tax rates meet the constitutional requirement since the degree of under-assessment appears to be lower for commercial properties than for residential.
7
The city of Chicago has historically assessed residential properties far below the statutory rate, but for the last two decades, the Assessor's Offi ce has been attempting to ease ratios up toward the statutory level, understanding that if they do so too quickly, they could incite a tax revolt. characteristics for all sales. 8 We use the Chicago CPI from the Bureau of Labor Statistics to express sales prices in 2003 dollars. We also include controls for the year of sale in the estimated models.
Ideally, assessment ratios would be calculated by dividing assessed values by market values. In practice, the market values of residential properties are typically approximated by their sales prices. Measurement errors associated with using sales price as a proxy for market value lead to several problems. First, since sales prices appear on both sides of the estimating equations, attenuation bias will tend to push estimates of α 1 downward (i.e., toward regressivity) if P is measured with error. This problem has been recognized in the literature. For example, Clapp (1990) constructs an instrumental variable for P using sample means for ranges of the sales price distribution. Second, sales take place after assessments are put in place, leading to date misalignment. Thus, sales prices must be adjusted back to the time of assessment, a process which can produce further measurement error if the price index is inaccurate or if times are recorded with some error.
More fundamentally, sales price can be considered a single point estimate of market value. In practice, the Cook County Assessor's Offi ce uses actual sales prices to estimate the market value of a property at the time of assessment. The Assessor estimates market value by regressing sales prices on property characteristics using separate regressions for each neighborhood. To illustrate the issues created by substituting sales prices for market values, suppose that the assessor forecasts market value perfectly, and that each home in a neighborhood has the same market value. Homes with low sales prices, thus, have negative errors, and homes with high sales prices have positive errors. Thus, the denominator of the assessment ratio is lower than would be indicated by its market value for low-priced properties, and it is higher than its true value for high-price properties. This pattern of bias for the denominator translates into a negative correlation between assessment ratios and sales price-a fi nding of regressivity-even though the ratio of assessments to market values is constant by assumption.
To address this spurious correlation between A/P and P, we follow a practice similar to the one actually used by the Cook County Assessor: replacing the actual sales price with its predicted value. The timing of the assessment cycle is important: while the Assessor's Office uses sales data from [2001] [2002] [2003] to construct A, we use sales prices from 2004-2005 to construct our estimate of market value. Thus, our predictions of sales prices are constructed using data that were not yet available at the time of assessment. Spurious correlation is mitigated by this procedure since the dependent variable remains A/P, while the explanatory variable is replaced by its predicted value.
Approximating the method employed by the Assessor's Offi ce, we pool several Chicago areas for the regressions and include dummy variables for the individual neighborhoods. Thus, we estimate separate regressions for 219 separate areas using data for properties that sold during [2004] [2005] . The dependent variable is the sales price, P, and explanatory variables 8 The IDOR sales fi le also includes data on other classes of properties, including commercial, industrial, and large apartment buildings. However, we only have complete assessment data on Class 2 properties, i.e., residential structures with six or fewer units. Class 2 properties include single-family homes, condominiums, and small multi-family rental buildings. Almost 80 percent of our full (sold and not sold) sample is comprised of single-unit properties, while the remaining 20 percent has more than one unit.
include structural characteristics and the date of sale by quarter. 9 The regression R 2 s range from 0.098 to 0.992, with an average of 0.505. Chicago includes a wide variety of houses, of many different vintages and vastly different conditions; it is not surprising that prices are somewhat diffi cult to predict even with an ample set of structural variables. 10 The task faced by the Assessor's Offi ce is a diffi cult one, and this diffi culty of predicting sales prices is one of the factors leading to variability in assessment ratios.
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In the remaining sections of the paper, we will present two separate sets of results from regression and logit models to address these potential sources of bias. First, we present the results for models using sales price directly for both the dependent variable (A/P) and explanatory variable (P). Second, we use the predicted values from standard hedonic regressions in place of P. Since the sales price models for the second set of regressions are not the primary focus of our study and we cannot present the results of all 219 regressions, the Appendix presents the results from a sales price regression applied to a pooled data set. Rather than allowing all coeffi cients to vary across neighborhoods, the Appendix model simply includes neighborhood fixed effects.
ASSESSMENT RATIO STATISTICS
By several measures, Chicago's assessments are variable and regressive. Table   1 , are lower than average prices. At 7.4 percent, the average annual appreciation rate is higher for the median price than for the average. The mean assessment is approximately $21,000, and the median is about $16,000 for all both years (recall that the statutory assessment ratio is 16 percent). Average and median assessments do not change 9 The full set of explanatory variables is listed in the Appendix. 10 The R 2 is not simply measuring the same thing as the number of sales. Across the 219 regressions, the correlation between the R 2 and the number of observations in the regression is -0.52. 11 Prior research suggests that sales price regressions can create sample selection bias if the sample of properties that sell is not representative of the full market, which includes properties that do not sell (Ihlanfeldt and Martinez-Vazquez, 1986; Gatzlaff and Haurin, 1997) . For example, homes with low assessments may be more (or less) likely to sell, and if this tendency is more pronounced at high sales prices where the gain to a low assessment is higher, then ratio studies will be biased toward a fi nding of regressivity. We constructed a predicted price variable using a standard Heckman (1979) two-stage procedure. The results are virtually identical when the prediction from the selection bias-corrected regression equations are substituted for the OLS predictions. (IAAO, 1999) for evaluating assessment ratio uniformity reveal a pronounced lack of uniformity. The IAAO calls the coeffi cient of dispersion "the most generally useful measure of variability" (see also Mehta and Giertz (1996) ). It measures the average percentage deviation of the assessment ratios from the median ratio, and is defi ned as 100/n Σ n i=1 The second measure of assessment ratio uniformity, the price-related differential (PRD), takes into account the tendency for high-priced properties to receive lower assessment ratios. It is simply the ratio of the simple mean to the value-weighted mean.
12 When PRD > 1, the simple mean is higher than the weighted mean in which assessment ratios drawn from higherpriced properties receive more weight. 
VERTICAL EQUITY: REGRESSION RESULTS
Following the traditional ratio study's method for evaluating vertical equity, Table 2 presents the results of regressions of assessment ratios on sales prices. The results for the traditional approach, which are labeled "Model 1," imply regressivity: the assessment ratio falls by 0.39 percentage points when price increases by $100,000. The regression also indicates that assessment ratios decline over time: relative to 2004, ratios are estimated to be 0.9 percentage points lower in 2005. This tendency for the assessment ratio to be smaller in the later year is a direct result of having constant assessed values in the face of rapidly increasing prices.
In Model 2 of Table 2 , predicted values of sales prices from neighborhood-specifi c versions of the model presented in the Appendix are used in place of actual prices as an explanatory variable. The results are nearly the same as before, albeit with a lower estimated degree of regressivity: assessment ratios are estimated to fall by 0.04 percentage points when price increases by $100,000. Table 3 introduces the sales frequency variable, measured as the number of 12 The value-weighted mean is defi ned as ΣP i R i /ΣP i , where P is the sales price. prior sales in each parcel's census tract, to the regression. The coeffi cient on this variable is signifi cantly negative under each specifi cation, indicating that assessment ratios tend to be higher in less active markets. While this fi nding provides some evidence of horizontal inequities (an increase in the number of sales in a census tract from 78 to 240-the 25 th percentile to the 75 th percentile-is associated with a decrease of 0.231 percentage points in the predicted assessment ratio in Model 1), the other results are not changed by the addition of this variable. The reason for this lack of change is that prices and the number of sales are not highly correlated; the correlation is -0.116 across the full sample of sales. These results imply that the conventional fi nding of regressivity is not altered after including sales frequency as an explanatory variable.
HORIZONTAL EQUITY: MULTINOMIAL LOGIT RESULTS
The regression results up to this point estimate conditional expectations: does the expected assessment ratio rise or fall as sales prices and frequencies increase? In this section, we address a different but related question using a multinomial logit model: do high sales prices and frequencies affect assessment uniformity? Thus, we now are estimating the effects of prices and sales frequencies on the distribution of assessment ratios rather than on the conditional mean. The base category (I = 0) for the logit models is the middle half of the assessment ratio distribution. The other two categories are the lowest 25 percent and highest 25 percent of the distribution. These categories are indicated by I = 1 and I = 2, respectively.
Though our objective for the multinomial logit is to analyze horizontal equity, the model also has implications for vertical inequity. The multinomial logit results presented in Table 4 are comparable to the assessment ratio regressions shown in Table 2 . As was the case in Table 2 , the multinomial logit model indicates that assessments are regressive when actual sales prices are used to measure market value. The positive coeffi cient on price for Model 1 in the top panel indicates that higher prices increase the probability that the assessment ratio will be in the lowest 25 percent of the distribution. The negative coeffi cients on price for Model 1 in the lower panel indicate that higher prices decrease the probability that the assessment ratio will be in the highest 25 percent of the distribution. Thus, the effect of sales price is similar to that implied by a simple regression: higher prices lead to lower assessment ratios. The result is different when predicted prices are used in place of actual prices. Higher estimated market values are predicted to increase the probability of having an assessment ratio in the middle of the distribution. Both extremely high and extremely low assessment ratios are less likely for higher-priced properties. Table 5 addresses horizontal equity by adding sales frequency as an explanatory variable to the multinomial logit model. As predicted, the number of sales variable does not have a simple monotonic relationship with the assessment ratio. In both estimated models, greater sales frequency leads to a lower probability of being in both the I = 1 and I = 2 categories. This pattern means that having more sales makes both extremes of the distribution less likely: with more sales, assessment ratios are more likely to cluster in the center of the distribution. The magnitude of the effects is not trivial: if a census tract were to move from the 25 th to the 75 th percentile of sales frequencies, its predicted probability of having an assessment ratio near the center of the distribution would rise by approximately 12 percentage points.
These results provide strong evidence that our prediction of assessor behavior holds. Having more sales makes it easier to produce uniform assessments. As a result, the distribution of assessment ratios is more closely clustered around the center. Thick markets help produce horizontal equity.
Adding the sales frequency variable to the logit model does not eliminate the fi nding of regressivity in the model using actual sales prices. In Model 1, higher prices increase the probability of having an assessment ratio in the bottom of the distribution while decreasing the probability of being in the top of the distribution. However, the patterns again change when the actual sales price is replaced by predicted prices: Model 2 indicates that while higher prices continue to decrease the probability of being in the top quarter of the distribution, they also decrease the probability of being in the bottom quarter. In other words, high prices act much like sales frequencies: by increasing the probability of being in the middle of the distribution. Lower-priced homes have a greater probability of being in both tails of the distribution.
To account for this result, it is important to bear in mind that intuition developed using linear regression models does not necessarily carry over to the logit models. Our multinomial logit models characterize the distribution of assessment ratios. The results indicate that high actual sales prices increase the probability of unusually low assessment ratios, while high predicted prices lower this probability. Percentage correctly predicted Effect of increasing the number of sales from 78 to 240 on average probability, base category Effect of increasing the number of sales from 78 to 240 on average probability, I = 1 Effect of increasing the number of sales from 78 to 240 on average probability, I = 2 The actual sales price includes an error representing the difference between market value and the measured sales price. A property with a high predicted sales pricea high market value-may prove easier to assess accurately than highly variable low-priced properties. In this case, high predicted sales prices can reduce the probability of having unusually low assessment ratios if the overarching goal of assessors is to cluster assessment ratios around a central value. A property with a sales price that exceeds market value will then produce an assessment ratio that falls in the lower part of the distribution. Our results are consistent with a model of Percentage correctly predicted Effect of increasing the number of sales from 78 to 240 on average probability, base category Effect of increasing the number of sales from 78 to 240 on average probability, I = 1 Effect of increasing the number of sales from 78 to 240 on average probability, I = 2 Note: The base category is the 25%-75% range of the full assessment ratio distribution. Absolute z-values are in parentheses. The sample is restricted to sales of single-unit properties. The number of observations is 39,443, of which 20,684 are in the base category, 9,124 are drawn from the lowest 25% of the assessment ratio distribution, and 9,635 come from the highest 25% of the distribution. assessor behavior by which assessors use predictions of market value to produce assessment ratios that are concentrated around a target value. Chicago is perhaps unusual in its treatment of any property with one to six units as roughly equivalent. In Table  6 , we re-estimate the multinomial logit model using only those properties that have a single living unit. Of the original 53,526 observations, 14,083 had more than one unit (26.3 percent), leaving 39,443 single-unit properties for the new logit model. We continue to use the same cutoff points as before to defi ne the categories for the dependent variable. The number of single-unit properties with I = 0 (i.e., the middle of the assessment ratio distribution) is now 20,684, with 9,124 drawn from the lower part of the distribution (I = 1) and 9,635 from the upper part (I = 2). Thus, rather than the original 50-25-25 mix of observations in categories 0, 1, 2, the new percentages are 52.4 percent, 23.1 percent, and 24.4 percent. Despite these changes, the results in Table 6 are very similar to the results for the full sample of residential assessment ratios. We again fi nd that greater sales frequencies are associated with a higher probability of assessment ratios in the center of the distribution. We again fi nd that higher predicted sales prices are also associated with higher probabilities of assessment ratios in the middle of the distribution.
These logit results suggest that focusing on conditional expectations gives a misleading view of the assessment process. While it is true that the average assessment ratio for a high-priced home is lower that the expected ratio for a lower-priced property, high prices may be serving to cluster assessment ratios closer to a single value. Similarly-and with more emphatic statistical support-homes in census tracts with active sales markets have lower expected assessment ratios that are clustered closer to a central value. By making prices easier to predict, higher sales frequencies reduce the variance of assessed values, leading to a greater degree of horizontal equity.
CONCLUSION
This study offers two important contributions to the literature on property tax assessment inequities. First, we include the number of sales in a census tract as an explanatory variable since sales provide information that helps to improve estimations of market value while providing homeowners with a basis for appeals. This variable is relevant not only to models that test for horizontal equity (Allen and Dare, 2002) , but also to those that test for vertical equity as well. Second, unlike previous studies of both kinds of equity, we use a multinomial logit model to characterize the distribution of assessment ratios rather than just the conditional expectation.
Our results provide only a partial explanation for the regressivity of property tax assessments in which owners of lower-priced homes are assessed at higher rates on average and, thus, bear an undue share of the property tax burden. We fi nd that accounting for the frequency of sales reduces but does not eliminate assessment regressivity.
In contrast, we fi nd the effects of sales frequency on the uniformity of assessment ratios to be quite pronounced. The sales frequency variable is highly signifi cant, and the effect is as predicted: a greater number of sales is associated with a decrease in the probability of being in either tail of the assessment ratio distribution. Both extremely high and extremely low assessment ratios are more likely in locations with few comparable sales, and owners there face greater uncertainty regarding property tax burdens.
Overall, the results strongly suggest that thin markets make estimating property values diffi cult and lead to horizontal inequities. When a property is located in an area with few comparable sales, the assessor has less information upon which to base assessments. In contrast, thick markets with ample sales are associated with more uniform assessments, both because of the availability of more data and the potential for more appeals. In active markets, information about market values and effective tax rates is likely to circulate among property owners. If property owners perceive themselves to be singled out for higher assessments, they will challenge their bills. Assessors can avoid these expensive appeals by both assessing below that required by statute and clustering assessment ratios near the center of the distribution, particularly in areas with more sales.
Even a small amount of non-uniformity may "covertly distribute (either by design or accidentally) arbitrarily high portions of governmental costs to certain properties" (Bowman and Mikesell, 1978, p. 137) . Moreover, when assessments are extremely unpredictable, as they are in low-sales environments, future investment may be suppressed. Indeed, empirical research has shown that greater volatility in land prices (into which an uncertain property tax burden may be capitalized) delays development (Cunningham, 2006) . While less of a problem in those thin markets where supply may be intentionally curbed (i.e., higher-income areas with density restrictions), those markets that are less active because of low incomes and greater perceived development risks could be made worse off.
Our fi ndings suggest that one of the sources of assessment variation and unpredictability is one over which individual assessors have little control, namely the relatively sparse number of comparable sales in certain markets. As a corrective action, assessors might consider following the examples of Texas and Washington and supplement their samples with random appraisals of unsold properties (Malme, 1991; Youngman, 1994) APPENDIX Table A1 shows the underlying structure of the hedonic price functions used to construct predicted sales prices. The dependent variable for the hedonic price models is the sales price in level form. The hedonic price models also include an intercept, seven variables representing the quarter of sale, and 219 neighborhood indicator variables; these results are omitted from the table. To illustrate the methods and variables used, Table A1 shows the results with pooled data and neighborhood fi xed effects. In practice, separate regression models are estimated for each neighborhood. 
